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Abstract
As corporate scandals proliferate, organizational researchers and practitioners have made calls for 
research providing guidance for those wishing to influence positive moral decision-making and 
behavior in the workplace. This study incorporates social cognitive theory and a vignette-based 
cognitive measure for moral imagination to examine (a) moral attentiveness and employee 
creativity as important antecedents of moral imagination and (b) creativity as a moderator of the 
positive relation- ship between moral attentiveness and moral imagination. Based on the results 
from supervisor–subordinate dyadic
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Introduction 
Recent high-impact corporate scandals have reminded 
companies of the severe consequences of separating cor- 
porate agendas from social values, resulting in increased 
pressure for organizations to minimize immoral employee 
behavior (Treviño et al. 2006; Sekerka et al. 2009; Wagner 
and Dittmar  2006). Because of this resurgent focus  on 
understanding and preventing corporate malfeasance, much 
research has been devoted to explicating models of work- 
place misconduct (Anand et al. 2004; Andreoli and 
Lefkowitz 2009; Marcus and Schuler 2004; Treviñ o and 
Weaver 2001). However, there has been a growing call 
from the field of positive organizational scholarship, 
informed by the rise of the positive psychology movement, 
that more research attention should be directed toward 
exploring the contextual and intrapersonal attributes that 
contribute to individual strengths rather than deficits if we 
are to foster organizational systems that actualize human 
potential (Cameron et al. 2003; Seligman et al. 2005). As 
such, the current research agenda for exploring ethical 
behavior in organizations is characterized by increasing 
appeals for studies that can help derive organizational-level 
prescriptions for positively influencing individual-level 
morality and moral motivation (Bright et al. 2006; Luthans 
and Avolio 2009; Wright and Quick 2009). Accordingly, 
the current study seeks to explore important determinants 
of moral imagination in the workplace. 
Werhane (1998, 1999, 2002) developed strong theoreti- 
cal arguments for moral imagination—a form of specialized 
moral reasoning that reflects one’s ability to understand a 
context from a number of different stakeholder perspec- 
tives, actualize new context-independent possibilities, and 
instigate the process of evaluating possibilities from a 
moral point of view. This conceptualization is in accord 
with decision-making researchers who have proposed that 
the capacity for moral reasoning is largely guided by 
conceptual schema that delineate the number of behavioral 
alternatives from which to choose when confronted with an 
ethically charged situation (Ashkanasy et al. 2006; Treviño 
and Brown 2004). Together these assertions indicate that 
those most capable of making good moral decisions are 
 
 
 
those who can generate a range of possible solutions when 
faced with an ethical
1  
dilemma. 
Behavioral ethics scholars argue that the moral 
imagination construct represents a critical ability for 
innovative moral employee decision-making and suggest 
that its exercise assists employees in avoiding 
questionable activities by enabling employees to create 
decision models that contribute positively to corporate and 
social well-being (Caldwell and Moberg 2007; Moberg 
and Seabright 2000; Werhane 1998, 1999, 2002). Despite 
much theoretical work postulating the antecedents of 
moral imagination in organizations, such discourses have 
largely been inferential and conceptual in nature 
(Godwin 2006). Based on this relative dearth of 
empirical findings, the current study serves two purposes. 
First, building on the theoretical work of moral 
imagination scholars (Caldwell and Moberg 2007; Moberg 
and Seabright 2000; Werhane 1998, 1999, 2002), this 
study provides one of the first empirical explorations of 
moral imagination as a theoretical construct. Second, 
drawing upon social cognitive theory (SCT) (Fiske and 
Taylor 1991), we identify two important antecedents of 
moral imagination: an individual’s level of moral atten- 
tiveness and their capacity  for creativity. This research 
adds to the literature on moral decision-making in 
organizations. Developing a better understanding of the 
antecedents of moral imagination in the workplace has 
important implications for organizational practitioners, 
business ethics researchers, and, by extension, the greater 
society within which organizations are embedded. 
 
 
Moral Imagination 
 
The concept of moral imagination is not new, appearing 
often in literary theory. While analogous to Kohlberg’s 
(1976) post-conventional stage of moral reasoning 
(wherein individuals prioritize equity, perspective-taking, 
and decision-making according to the universal principles 
of morality rather than societal laws and values), moral 
imagination is drawn from a pragmatic conceptualization 
of moral understanding. Pragmatist ethics focuses on the 
day-to-day life-experiences of individuals who are socially 
and historically embedded (Fesmire 2003; Krebs and 
Denton 2005). This perspective emphasizes an under- 
standing of problems and their resolution while rooted in 
this context. This is in contrast to the deontological per- 
spective of cognitive developmental research on morality 
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While we recognize that the terms ethical and moral have 
somewhat different connotations, for purposes of this article, we will 
use the terms interchangeably, with both referring to a utilitarian view 
where an action is presumed to be ‘‘better’’ or more desirable when it 
benefits more people (i.e., stockholders and other stakeholders in 
society). 
that focuses on abstract moral principles. The pragmatist 
approach allows for the fact that there are multiple factors 
at play in moral situations. Thus, this approach speaks to 
the problem-oriented needs of the business practitioner 
(Frederick 2000) and organizational stakeholders. It is from 
the pragmatists’ school of thought that moral imagination 
has emerged as a framework for the study of moral 
reasoning and ethical decision-making in organizations. 
In their application of moral imagination to 
organizational decision-making, authors have 
conceptualized this construct in slightly different ways 
(Caldwell and Moberg 2007; Moberg and Seabright 
2000; Werhane 1998, 1999, 2002). However, the 
common theme underlying each conceptualization is that 
moral imagination is a requisite com- ponent of 
responsible moral judgment as it enables one to disengage 
from a situation in order to consider new possibilities and 
evaluate these possibilities in terms of their moral 
worth and potential for positive  impact. Because 
mental models used for decision-making are socially 
constructed, incomplete, and flexible with regard to their 
application (Rest 1986), they can be strategically modified 
to facilitate sounder moral judgment by those predisposed to 
think about moral concerns. In contrast to employees who 
approach ethical problems using limited mental models 
governed by partial perspectives (e.g., rule-based concerns), 
morally imaginative employees have the ability to disengage 
from such mental models to actualize context-independent 
possibilities and evaluate both the status quo and newly 
formulated possible outcomes from a moral standpoint. 
Based upon the philosophical works of Smith (1776/ 
1977) and Kant (1781/1970), Werhane (1998) encapsulated 
and crystallized the definition of moral imagination by 
proposing it as a process that involves ‘‘at least four things: 
(1) that one disengage oneself from one’s role, one’s par- 
ticular situation, or context; (2) that one becomes aware of 
the kind of scheme one has adopted and/or that is operating 
in a particular kind of context; (3) that one creatively envi- 
sion new possibilities, possibilities for fresh ways to frame 
experiences and new solutions to present dilemmas; and (4) 
that one evaluate the old context, the scope, or range of the 
conceptual schemes at work, and new possibilities.’’ In other 
words, moral imagination encompasses not only awareness 
of the moral implications of one’s actions in a situation, but 
also an ability to reframe a situation and create moral 
alternatives to the situation at hand. An individual must first 
be able to perceive or distinguish the moral issues in a sit- 
uation, including their impact on others beyond themselves, 
before they can generate decision options that take into 
account concerns of others. If one does not ‘‘encode,’’ or 
remains unaware of, the moral issues in a situation, he or she 
will respond solely out of self-interest. However, to be 
morally imaginative, one cannot stop merely at the recog- 
nition of moral issues within a situation, but rather the 
 
 
 
individual must engage in additional processes that create 
alternative solutions to a situation. It is the unique 
convergence of these abilities that results in moral 
imagination. Thus, the key measurable and quantifiable 
criteria for this construct are the ability to identify any 
moral conflicts embedded within a situation, define the 
relevant stakeholders impacted by the circumstances, and 
develop a range of alternative solutions from a moral 
perspective. 
This conceptualization goes beyond simply defining 
moral imagination as an innate trait one possesses. Instead, 
moral imagination can best be thought of as a unique 
cognitive process that an individual applies when making a 
decision. As such, moral imagination is theoretically and 
ontologically distinct from recent operationalizations of 
other individual difference variables that have been shown 
to influence ethical decision-making (e.g., moral aware- 
ness, Reynolds 2006; moral sensitivity, Sparks and Hunt 
1998). Rather than portraying moral imagination as a 
personal characteristic, this cognitive framing of moral 
imagination allows for the possibility that it can be 
selectively exercised by individuals with every decision 
they face and influenced by intra-individual factors 
(Werhane 1998, 1999, 2002). 
In this vein, much research has investigated person-rela- 
ted correlates of morality. For example, intelligence has been 
known to be a powerful explanatory variable of moral 
judgment for some time. Early reviews of the cognitive 
ability–morality relationship provide evidence of a sub- 
stantial positive association (Chassell 1935; Kingsbury 
1936), and more recent empirical work corroborates these 
assertions (Cohn and Westenberg 2004; Loviscky et al. 
2007; Wells and Schminke 2001). Together, results such as 
these clearly indicate that cognition underlies the develop- 
ment of moral judgment skills that involve reasoning with 
increasingly complex moral dilemmas. Thus, change over 
time from less advanced modes of thinking to more advanced 
forms represents an important element in cognitive expla- 
nations of moral judgment. In all, because reasoning at the 
more advanced stages of moral development is more com- 
plex, cognitive ability is thought to be a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for moral judgment (Narvaez 1993). 
Additionally, other researchers have highlighted the role 
of emotion as a powerful contributor to the decision-making 
process (e.g., Loewenstein et al. 2001; Vohs et al. 2007). 
Recent debates in the extant morality literature have focused 
on the precedence of emotion over cognitive processing, 
with some arguing that when it comes to morality, emotions 
play the primary causal role (e.g., Haidt 2001), and others 
have defended the role of higher-order reasoning as the 
critical causal determinant of moral judgment (e.g., Pizarro 
and Bloom 2003). That is, while deliberate cognitive pro- 
cesses do affect moral judgment, some argue that the dom- 
inance  of effortful  reasoning is attenuated by empirical 
evidence indicating that much processing of morality-laden 
scenarios is initiated prior to conscious thought (e.g., Bargh 
and Ferguson 2000). According to this perspective, emotion 
is thought to underlie cognition and guide behavior in a 
general sense. In effect, emotion underscores to the morally 
salient features of our environment by capturing attention 
and serving as a catalyst for logical reflection and moral 
motivation (Greenspan and Shanker 2004). For example, 
Haidt (2000), in his social intuitionist model of moral 
judgment, suggests that moral judgments often suddenly and 
effortlessly appear in consciousness, without any conscious 
awareness of having gone through the steps of searching, 
weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion. 
While the question of the primacy of emotions over rea- 
son in affecting judgment is outside the scope of this study, it 
is important to note that individual differences in chronic 
emotional states do tend to influence the effortful processing 
of morally relevant aspects of the situation. For example, in 
the context of decision-making, Lerner and Keltner (2001) 
showed  that  fearful  individuals  favor  deliberation  and 
safety, whereas anger leads to less analysis and more risk- 
taking. In addition, disgust sensitivity has been linked to 
thinking styles (differences in the propensity to rely on 
intuition versus deliberation; Bartels 2008). These results 
are consistent with the view that emotions play an important 
role in determining moral judgment and that individual 
differences impact the extent to which emotional reactions 
are incorporated into judgments (Nichols and Mallon 2006). 
The intuition versus deliberation debate notwithstanding 
recent research has begun to investigate how moral judg- 
ments are pre-consciously guided and influenced by an 
individual’s conceptual schemata related to morality. The 
extent to which a given situation is coded as morally relevant 
seems to depend on individuals’ idiosyncratic mapping of 
the moral domain and their tendency to see the world in 
moral terms (Lapsley and Narvaez 2004; Reynolds 2008). 
For instance, if an individual does not encode a situation as 
moral, there may be little motivation to act according to 
moral standards or exert effort in generating viable, mutu- 
ally beneficial solutions in that particular situation. 
Determinants of Moral Imagination 
Moral Attentiveness 
 
Organizational scholars have long argued that the primary 
catalyst of ethical decision-making is the ability to recog- 
nize that a moral issue exists in a given situation (Jones 
1991; Rest 1986). In accordance with these assertions, 
moral imagination researchers propose that in order to 
initiate the moral imagination process, it is required that 
one must first interpret a situation as ethically significant 
in  order  to  exercise  moral  imagination  (Johnson  1993; 
 
 
 
Werhane 1998). Only after identification of a moral 
problem can individuals establish morality as an important 
element in the decision-making process and ultimately 
engage in a moral action. To date, many studies have 
suggested that individuals vary in their ability to recognize 
moral issues (Butterfield et al. 2000; Cohen et al. 2004; 
Reynolds 2006), suggesting that individuals differ in the 
amount of attention they devote to morality and moral 
matters. 
SCT provides a theoretical basis for examining and 
understanding the role of individual differences in one’s 
ability to recognize moral issues. Grounded in the work of 
Bandura (1977, 1986), SCT poses that human behavior is 
determined by the triadic interaction of individual 
cognition, actual behaviors, and the environment. While 
not discounting the traditional behaviorist notion that 
behavior is a response to raw, objective stimuli within 
the environment, SCT argues that behavior is also filtered 
and controlled largely by cognitive processes which 
idiosyncratically construct and color an individual’s 
perceptions of reality (Jones 1989). Thus, not all aspects of 
environmental stimuli are processed when one is faced 
with making a situational decision, rather certain elements 
are ignored and others are selectively attended to (Fiske 
and Taylor 1991). When an individual engages the 
decision-making process, they begin by encoding (i.e., 
processing and taking into their cognition) pieces of 
information from the environment. However, the 
relevance of contextual information is based on the 
salience and vividness of the incoming stimuli as well as 
the accessibility of the cognitive framework used to 
identify and process incoming information. 
Based on Fiske and Taylor’s (1991) framework and 
research on moral awareness (Rest 1986; Butterfield et al. 
2000), Reynolds (2008) recently developed and validated a 
quasi-personality trait known as moral attentiveness, the 
extent to which an individual perceives morality and moral 
elements in his or her experiences. According to its oper- 
ational definition, moral attentiveness influences the extent 
to which one proactively screens stimuli for morally rele- 
vant information and constructs moral issues based on the 
accessibility of one’s cognitive framework for morality. 
Those that have more chronically accessible frameworks 
for morality are simply more apt to interpret any given 
situation as morality-laden. It is in this sense that moral 
attentiveness can be distinguished from other morality- 
based individual difference variables; moral attentiveness 
does not assume specific foci. Instead, it assumes that any 
and all stimuli may be morally relevant to the individual. 
Over a series of studies, Reynolds (2008) found that 
morality is a specific cognitive category that serves as a 
chronically accessible framework that makes an individual 
perceptually and reflectively attentive to moral matters. 
During construct validation, Reynolds demonstrated that 
the attention one pays to moral stimuli shapes a variety of 
moral behaviors (e.g., the recall/reporting of moral 
experiences and charitable giving). 
Because moral attentiveness is a critical prerequisite for 
an individual to define the moral issues embedded in a 
situation, we argue that moral attentiveness should be an 
important precursor to engagement in the moral 
imagination process. According to Fiske and Taylor 
(1991), increased attention to morality increases the 
accessibility of salient and vivid stimuli. Accordingly, 
individuals that are more sensitive to moral issues in 
general will be more likely to engage in cognitive 
processes that focus on identifying impacted stakeholders 
and generating alternatives that positively influence 
others beyond themselves. Those that do not encode, or 
become attentive to, the moral issues in a situation will not 
be able to generate such behavioral alternatives. Extending 
this logic, we propose: 
Hypothesis 1 Moral attentiveness will  be  positively 
related to moral imagination. 
 
Employee Creativity 
 
Given that moral imagination requires cognition beyond 
simply attending to moral issues in a situation, but also 
involves generating alternative solutions and recognizing 
the impact of those potential solutions on others (Werhane 
1998, 1999, 2002), an individual’s creative cognitive 
capacity may also impact the ability to demonstrate moral 
imagination. Although ethical cognition can be attributed 
to schema-based personality characteristics that direct 
one’s ascription of importance to moral issues, we argue 
that one’s level of creativity will be associated with moral 
imagination and should augment the influence of moral 
attentiveness on its expression. 
Creativity is a complex phenomenon and as such, it has 
been variously defined. Most definitions, however, 
encompass two requirements. First, a ‘‘creative’’ person 
must generate novel or original ideas, and second, those 
ideas must be judged as valuable, useful, or unique by 
appropriate observers (Amabile 1996; Czikszentmihalyi 
1996; Simonton 1996). While there is debate regarding 
whether creativity is a cognitive ability to be demonstrated, 
or a personality trait that is/is not possessed (i.e., Cattell 
1971; Halpin et al. 1974), for purposes of this article, we 
employ the cognitive conceptualization of the construct. 
Although research suggests that creativity is an impor- 
tant factor in the creation of effective organizations and 
managers (Mott 1972; Scratchley and Hakstain 2001), 
solutions to complex interpersonal problems (Plucker and 
Renzulli 1999), and even a healthy society (Mumford and 
Gustafson 1988), very little research has empirically 
investigated the influence of creativity on ethical decision- 
 
 
 
making. Empirical evidence for the link between creativity 
and moral reasoning was demonstrated by Mumford et al. 
(2010). Importantly, they hypothesized and established this 
relationship by including not just the generation if ideas as 
the basis of creative thinking but also the ability and 
capacity to identify implications of decisions. In all, they 
argue that the potential for creative thinking should provide 
an individual with the capacity to see many more alterna- 
tive courses of action than non-creative individuals. 
Another recent study by Bierly et al. (2009) applied 
Forsyth’s (1992) personal moral philosophy model and 
demonstrated positive links between creativity and ideal- 
ism (an individual’s concern for others) and creativity and 
relativism (a tendency to rely on idiosyncratic decision- 
making processes and reject the use of cognitive scripts in 
moral dilemmas). The authors argue that highly creative 
people are likely ‘‘situationists,’’ individuals who are 
intent on analyzing situational specifics during decision- 
making (especially in ambiguous circumstances), yet are 
guided largely by an ethic of harm avoidance (Forsyth 
1980). Their results indicate that creativity does influence 
moral decision-making when one encounters unique and 
complex moral issues and, from a social cognitive 
perspective, suggest that creative individuals are able to 
maintain two particular goals when faced an ethical 
dilemma: they strive to ensure harm avoidance  and 
they employ non-constrained thinking when evaluating an 
ethical situation. 
Others have applied similar reasoning, arguing that 
creativity may represent a type of preconscious automa- 
ticity that impacts how an individual cognitively responds 
to an ethically charged situation (Narvaez and Lapsley 
2005). As such, creativity can be described as an auto- 
matic, goal-directed activation of schemas or scripts (i.e., 
harm avoidance and non-constrained thinking) outside of 
conscious awareness resulting from a triggering event (i.e., 
an ethical dilemma). 
In this vein, business ethics theorists postulate that 
creativity may interact with increased attention to morality 
(i.e., moral attentiveness) to facilitate the moral imagina- 
tion process (Johnson 1993; Werhane 1998, 1999, 2002). 
One is capable of making ethical decisions to the extent 
that moral schemas are chronically accessible for social 
information processing (Fiske and Taylor 1991); however, 
to more fully exercise moral imagination, moral 
attentiveness in the presence of creativity anchors the 
possibilities one creates in a moral schema. In the context 
of decision-making, creativity allows the individual to 
generate more behavioral alternatives and more fully 
imagine the harm and benefit that could result from 
each option. Thus, once a moral issue has been 
identified, creativity should augment one’s ability to 
articulate alternatives, empathetically imagine how others 
will experience these 
alternatives, and consider their possible ramifications on 
the interests of others. Thus, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 2A Employee creativity will be positively 
associated with moral imagination. 
Hypothesis 2B The positive association between moral 
attentiveness and moral imagination will be moderated by 
employee creativity such that this link will be stronger for 
highly creative employees. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Participants included 253 employed undergraduate students 
from a midsize, Midwestern university who received extra 
course credit for their participation in the study. To 
participate, individuals must have been working at least 
part time and willing to give permission for the 
researchers to contact their supervisors. Participants’ 
supervisors were contacted via email and surveyed 
regarding the target subordinate. Subordinates whose 
supervisors did not participate were excluded from 
further analysis. Supervisors returned a total of 162 
surveys, yielding a response rate of 
64.03 %. 
The  average  age  of  the  subordinate  participants  was 
24.2 years  old,  with  a  mean  tenure  of  approximately 
28.5 months. The sample was 51.7 % female, 92.3 % 
Caucasian, 5.5 % African-American, and 2.2 % classified 
themselves as Asian American, Hispanic American, or 
Other. 
The average age of the supervisors was 42.9 years, with 
an average management tenure of approximately 8 years. 
Supervisors had, on average, supervised the target 
employee   for   24 months.  The   supervisor  sample   was 
61.7 % female, 88.3 % Caucasian, 2.5 % African-American, 
and the remaining 9.2 % identified themselves as Asian 
American, Hispanic American, or Other. 
 
Procedure and Design 
 
An online survey was created and all data collection was 
done via the Internet in a laboratory setting. Upon 
accessing the survey website, participants first read a brief 
overview of the study. Because of the potential to influence 
responses in a socially desirable manner, the description of 
the study did not specifically indicate that the topic being 
examined was ‘‘moral imagination.’’ Rather, the study was 
framed as a general exploration of organizational decision- 
making. 
Once participants completed measures designed to 
assess demographic information, they were administered 
 
 
 
an online version of the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT) 
(to be used as a control variable) and then asked to fill out 
survey measures designed to tap their levels of moral 
attentiveness. Subsequent to this, participants were asked 
to read two business vignettes and respond to a series of 
questions afterward. Answers to these questions were 
coded and used to establish participants’ scores for moral 
imagination. Upon survey completion, subordinates 
completed a consent form allowing their supervisors to be 
contacted. The supervisor  survey  assessed  levels  of 
focal employee creativity and supervisor demographic 
information. 
 
Measures 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Moral Imagination In order to gauge employee moral 
imagination, scenarios describing two business dilemmas 
were created. For the purposes of this study, we sought to 
control for the effects of moral intensity by constructing 
and employing scenarios representing situations 
characterized by high-moral intensity (Appendix). Jones 
(1991) proposed that moral intensity, the extent of 
issue-related imperative in a given situation, is likely to 
influence the amount of effort expended during cognitive 
processing, in part by increasing attributions of 
responsibility to oneself for the decision’s likely 
consequences to others. Indeed, this assertion has 
received some empirical support in vignette-based studies 
(e.g., May and Pauli 2002; Nill and Schibrowsky 2005; 
Paolillo and Vitell 2002). Recent research indicates that 
the predominant element comprising moral intensity is the 
expected harm (expressed as a high likelihood of 
immediate, substantial, and long-ranging harm) that may 
befall the target character in the vignette (Kish-Gephart 
et al. 2010; McMahon and Harvey 2007). Using these 
operational criteria, the vignettes were each worded to 
reflect a high degree of moral intensity. Each vignette 
was pilot tested on a sample of 62 representative 
students who indicated that expected harm was very likely 
in each scenario.
2 
For each vignette, participants were 
asked to read a scenario that described a specific business 
dilemma, envision that they were in a position to make a 
decision on the situation and asked to respond to the fol- 
lowing three questions: 
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For pilot-testing purposes, participants were asked to rate  how 
likely it was that immediate, substantial, and long-ranging harm 
would befall the victim in each scenario. Responses were rated on a 
1–5 (Not at All Likely–Extremely Likely) scale. Results indicate that 
participants found a high likelihood of harm for each scenario (mean 
for Scenario 1 = 4.47; mean for Scenario 2 = 4.28). 
1. List as many ways as you can think of to take action on 
this situation. 
2. Describe the underlying moral issues that are 
important to consider when deciding on which of the 
above actions to take in this situation. 
3. Identify who you think will be impacted by your 
decision and how they will be impacted. 
Given that vignette-based measures result in open- 
ended responses, coding was necessary to transform the 
qualitative data generated into scores that could be used 
for subsequent statistical analysis. Three coders were used 
to rate the number of possible actions that respondents 
reported, the number of underlying moral issues reported, 
and the number of entities impacted by his/her decision. 
In order to facilitate a shared mental model surrounding 
the coding scheme, all coders were extensively trained. 
Coders then independently rated practice responses from 
40 participants who participated in a pilot study. An ini- 
tial estimate of interrater agreement from the pilot study 
sample was found to be marginal (ICC = 0.73). After 
conferring to discuss the disagreements among the ratings 
using a consensus process, coders were given participant 
responses from the focal sample to code independently. 
Interrater agreement for the three raters on responses from 
the focal participant sample was acceptable (ICC = 0.92). 
Following obtainment of sufficient agreement levels, the 
aggregate  score  from  the  three  ratings  was  used  as  a 
measure of moral imagination for each participant  and 
each scenario. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Moral Attentiveness Moral attentiveness was measured 
using 12 items developed by Reynolds (2008) that tap the 
extent to which individuals recognize and consider moral 
matters in everyday experience. A sample item (a = 0.89) 
reads ‘‘I often find myself pondering about ethical issues.’’ 
 
Creativity We measured creativity by adapting a 5-item 
scale used in previous studies (Zhou and George 2001). 
Each employee’s supervisor rated the extent to which he/ 
she agreed that each of the five behaviors was characteristic 
of the employee being rated. Supervisor ratings are widely 
used and are accepted in the creativity and innovation lit- 
erature (Van der Vegt and Janssen 2003; Zhou and Shalley 
2003). Sample items are ‘‘This employee is a good source 
of creative ideas’’ and ‘‘This employee often has a fresh 
approach to problems.’’ We averaged responses  to  the 
five items  to  create  the  creativity measure  (Cronbach’s 
a = 0.96). 
Control variables. The influence of age, gender, race, 
and  organizational  tenure  on  ethical  perceptions  and 
 
 
 
behaviors represent fairly stable and consistent relation- 
ships noted in the research literature (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1990; Franke et al. 1997; Henle et al. 2005). As 
such, all participants were asked to provide their age, 
gender, ethnicity, and tenure with their organization. 
In addition, because intelligence has been found to 
influence the capacity for moral reasoning (Chassell 1935; 
Cohn and Westenberg 2004; Loviscky et al. 2007; Wells 
and Schminke 2001), we included cognitive ability as a 
covariate. For this study, cognitive ability was measured 
with the WPT. Designed as a speeded test, the WPT is a 
12-min timed  test consisting  of  50 multiple-choice and 
short-answer items that tap verbal ability, numerical abil- 
ity, general knowledge, and spatial relations. Test scores 
range from 1 to 50, and adult working-class norms indicate 
a mean score of 21.75 with a standard deviation of 7.6 
(Wonderlic, Inc.  2002). Internal  consistency reliabilities 
range from 0.88 to 0.94, test–retest values range from 0.82 
to 0.94, and alternate form estimates range from 0.73 to 
0.95 (Wonderlic, Inc. 2002). 
Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and zero-order 
correlations for the variables used to test our hypotheses. 
 
Tests of Hypotheses 
 
The hierarchical moderated multiple regressions used to 
test Hypotheses 1–2B are shown in Table 2. The test of 
Hypotheses 1 occurs in Step 2 of Table 2. As shown, the 
standardized regression coefficients were significant  for 
moral   attentiveness   for   both   scenarios   (Scenario   1: 
b = 0.46,  p \ 0.01;  Scenario  2:  b = 0.33,  p \ 0.01). 
These results support Hypothesis 1. Similarly, the stan- 
dardized regression coefficients for employee creativity 
were significant for both scenarios (Scenario 1: b = 0.22, 
p \ 0.01; Scenario 2: b = 0.23, p \ 0.01), supporting 
Hypothesis  2A.  The  moral  attentiveness 9 employee 
 
 
Table 1  Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations of all study variables 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
1. Gender 
2. Age -0.06 
3. Race 0.01 -0.01 
4. Tenure 0.13 0.35** 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t 
p \ 0.10; ** p \ 0.01 
 
Table 2   Hierarchical 
moderated multiple regression 
results 
 
 
Regression step Moral imagination (Scenario 1) Moral imagination (Scenario 2) 
 
   
R2 DR2 b R2 DR2 b 
 
Step 1 
 
 
0.17* 
-0.11 
-0.17* 
0.07 
Cognitive ability 0.22** 0.23** 
Step 2 
Moral attentiveness 0.46 0.31 0.45** 0.33 0.14 0.34** 
Creativity   0.22**   0.23** 
t 
p \ 0.10; * p \ 0.05; 
** p \ 0.01 
Step 3 
Creativity 9 Moral attentiveness 0.51 0.05 0.14* 0.33 0.00 0.02 
5. Cognitive ability -0.06 -0.21** -0.10 -0.08    
6. Moral attentiveness 0.01 -0.13 0.03 -0.08 0.34**  
7. Moral imagination (Scenario 1) 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 0.09 0.38** 0.49** 
8. Moral imagination (Scenario 2) 0.07 -0.12 -0.10 0.06 0.35** 0.33** 0.62**   
9. Creativity -0.02 -0.10 0.04 0.15t 0.33** 0.40** 0.39** 0.30**  
Mean 1.08 24.16 1.09 28.38 23.15 3.11 8.29 8.06 3.71 
SD 0.50 6.90 0.39 27.53 5.59 0.74 3.16 2.63 1.01 
 
Gender 0.15 0.14t 0.19 
Age  -0.12  
Race  -0.06  
Tenure  0.08  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 The interaction of moral attentiveness and creativity on moral 
imagination 
 
creativity interaction  term added  significant incremental 
variance at Step 3 for Scenario 1 (b = 0.14, p \ 0.01), 
which is plotted in Fig. 1 at one standard deviation around 
the centered mean (Aiken and West 1991). In order to more 
fully understand the nature of the interaction, we tested the 
differences in slopes using the Z-test for correlated 
associations (Meng et al. 1992). As hypothesized, the link 
between moral attentiveness and moral imagination is 
stronger for more creative employees than those rated less 
creative by supervisors (z = 3.49, p \ 0.05). The moral 
attentiveness 9 creativity interaction term failed to attain 
significance for Scenario 2 (b = 0.02, p = ns), providing 
partial support for Hypothesis 2B. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The hypotheses for this study were largely supported. In 
accordance with our theoretical framework, we found that 
moral attentiveness positively influences one’s moral 
imagination. Furthermore, we found partial support for the 
augmenting effects of employee creativity on the relation- 
ship between moral attentiveness and moral imagination. 
In practical application, our results reveal that 
individuals who chronically perceive and consider 
morality and moral elements in everyday experiences are 
more likely to imaginatively discern various moral 
possibilities for acting in a given situation. These findings 
lend support to the body of work done by a variety of 
scholars suggesting that ethical decision-making begins 
with (or is at least impacted by) an individual’s ability to 
recognize moral issues in a situation (Butterfield et al. 
2000; Jones 1991; Rest 1986; 
Reynolds 2008). 
Given the relationship between moral attentiveness and 
moral imagination, these findings  have implications for 
employee training as well as broader organizational change 
efforts. Because of the increasing societal pressure on 
businesses to behave ethically and responsibly, it seems 
increasingly prudent for organizational decision-makers to 
thoughtfully consider and selectively place into key 
management positions those who are cognitively inclined 
toward morality and with a view toward a more ethical 
culture within their organizations. For morally attentive 
individuals, topics that center on ethics are consistent with 
their world- view. To the extent that morally attentive 
individuals are identified and placed in strategically 
pivotal positions, they could foster an ethical environment 
and provide the energy necessary for organizational 
ethics initiatives to be successful (Brass et al. 1998). 
Practically speaking, such initiatives can be achieved by 
setting, communicating, and managing performance 
according to clear ethical standards, conducting periodic 
ethics audits, and sharing feedback with employees in such 
a manner as to stimulate discussion and employee input 
into goal-setting. Leaders can also conduct ethics training 
sessions, help devise clear codes of ethical conduct, and 
institute programs for rewarding ethical con- duct within 
their organizations. Thus, a critical element for building 
and sustaining momentum for such ethics-related change 
efforts may lie in an organization’s ability and 
willingness to recognize morally attentive employees and 
put them in positions of authority. 
Our results also indicate that employee creativity not 
only has main effects on moral imagination, but also 
strengthens the association between moral attentiveness 
and moral imagination. Creativity may enable individuals 
to develop complex solutions to difficult ethical problems 
(Buchholz and Rosenthal 2005). Creative and imaginative 
people tend to use cognitive processes that are consistent 
with higher levels of moral development, which may lead 
to a higher level of ethics and more innovative 
consideration of the  problem at  hand (Buchholz and 
Rosenthal 2005; Teal and Carroll 1999). Based on our 
results, the implementation of development programs 
meant to influence employee creativity may be wise. 
The organizational context is an important determinant 
investigated by many scholars in the area of creativity 
(Amabile 1996; Ekvall 1997; Oldham and Cummings 1996; 
Shalley et al. 2000). Indeed, many companies now empha- 
size the importance of creativity by instituting creativity 
management programs. In attempting to create and 
facilitate an effective organizational culture of creativity 
and innovation, building an organizational learning culture 
is of critical necessity (Dweck 2000; Dweck and Leggett 
1988; Redmond et al. 1993). To create a productive 
organizational learning culture, leaders in organizations 
should openly  support  continued  learning  opportunities,  
foster a harmonious and collaborative organizational 
culture, and provide timely and accurate developmental 
feedback (Steelman et al. 2004). 
 
 
 
In doing so, they should also consider carefully the roles 
of supervisors and managers within the organization. 
Research has demonstrated that employee creativity will 
flourish when supervisors apply transformational leadership 
principles (Jaussi and Dionne 2003; Shin and Zhou 2003). 
For example, managerial behaviors likely to foster favorable 
conditions for the development of creativity include creative 
role-modeling, instructing employees on creativity-relevant 
skills, the provision of hands-on opportunities to apply these 
skills, offering support and encouragement, and the 
provision of a clear visionary direction. 
According to Werhane (1999), many of the ethical 
mistakes managers make are due to a paucity of moral 
imagination. In all, our results suggest that morally atten- 
tive individuals have a better-developed sense of moral 
imagination, suggesting that they generate behavioral 
options that are not provincially embedded in a restricted 
context and have a capacity for reframing the problem from 
various perspectives. Additionally, our results indicate that 
one’s creativity can augment the influence of moral 
attentiveness on moral imagination. A capacity for 
creativity may enable individuals to develop a more 
extensive set of context-independent, novel alternatives to 
the problem that can be morally justified. Contending 
with ethical issues requires careful application of 
principles and weighing of moral considerations. In an 
organizational context, when faced with an ethically 
charged business- related decision, employees must be 
able to understand the social, economic, organizational, 
and personal factors that are at play, an awareness of 
how moral conflicts might unfold, and an ability to 
envision outcomes that benefit all stakeholders mutually 
(Vidaver-Cohen 1997). Higher lev- els of creativity may 
help the individual understand dis- similar characters, 
situations, or experiences in the context of moral decision-
making (Werhane 1999). 
From a theoretical perspective, our mixed results across 
scenarios are intriguing. Whereas we found full support for 
our hypotheses using the first scenario, expected relation- 
ships were non-significant using the second. While not the 
focus of this study, these results suggest that respondents 
may have differentially weighted each scenario according 
to perceived moral intensity, which in turn set a precedent 
for moral imagination. 
As conceptualized, moral imagination is a conscious, 
voluntary cognitive process and, as such, its activation may 
be at the discretion of the decision-maker (Caldwell and 
Moberg 2007; Moberg and Seabright 2000; Werhane 1998, 
1999, 2002). Based on Jones (1991), this decision may rest 
on the level of moral intensity attributed to the situation, 
which is itself informed by a variety of situational char- 
acteristics and how individuals respond to those elements. 
For example, our first scenario dealt with pregnancy, 
making  one  of  the  ‘‘victims’’  an  unborn  child.  To  the 
degree that social norms dictate that no harm come to the 
unborn (perhaps illustrated by Jones’ notion of social 
consensus—the degree of peer agreement that an action is 
wrong), the overall moral intensity of the situation may 
increase, guiding deeper moral cognitive processing for our 
first scenario. 
In addition, our scenarios differed in terms of the gender 
of the victim, which may be a particularly salient 
situational consideration depending on the gender of the 
respondents. Relational demography has been found to 
increase liking, trust, and favoritism (Bauer and Green 
1996; Turban and Jones 1988), suggesting that demo- 
graphic similarity may influence the level of cognitive 
effort respondents are willing to exert in order to generate 
mutually beneficial outcomes. Future research should 
consider how embedded contextual cues influence scripts 
for moral reasoning, how and to what extent moral issues 
can be made salient to employees, and whether doing so 
affects ethical decision-making. 
In a related vein, several studies have shown that, within 
a business context, people generally rely on lower levels of 
moral judgment than they would in other settings (Car- 
pendale and Krebs 1995; Marnburg 2001; Weber 1990) and 
that   some   occupations   (e.g.,   accounting)   select   and 
socialize newcomers to reason at a lower level of morality 
(Abdolmohammadi et al. 2003). Results such as these may 
be  interpreted  to  mean  that  managers,  executives,  and 
accountants have lower moral reasoning abilities than other 
populations. An alternative explanation, and one that is 
consistent with the concept of moral imagination, is that 
moral judgment is a fluid rather than static capacity and 
that it can be employed differentially depending on con- 
textual   cues   and   constraints.   Future   research   should 
empirically  examine  the  extent  to  which  occupational 
choice influences moral imagination and, perhaps more 
importantly, the direction of causality for this association. 
Further, moral judgment in general has been found to be 
associated with moral action in many studies predicting 
both positive (e.g., helping, whistle-blowing, and resistance 
to  pressure  from  authority  figures)  and  negative  (e.g., 
cheating and stealing) behaviors (see Greenberg 2002; Rest 
and Narvaez 1994; Thoma 1994; Treviñ o 1992). Future 
research should investigate the influence of moral 
imagination on such discrete behaviors to determine if the 
moral imagination construct accounts for incremental 
variance in the  prediction  of  important  outcomes  or  
serves  as  an 
indirect influence on the moral judgment–behavior link. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
Although our findings have helped to answer recent calls in 
the ethics literature, our study did have several limitations. 
 
 
 
For example, one limitation of this study was our use of a 
student sample, which limits generalizability. While our 
sample was composed of older student employees with 
more work experience than traditional college students, use 
of this sample may have nevertheless restricted the range 
on relevant job-related variables. For example, our sample 
had an average tenure of 2 years and 4 months. If any of the 
constructs under study preferentially require a significant 
amount of time on the job to form associations, our 
findings may be artificially enhanced or attenuated. Future 
researchers should attempt to replicate our results on older, 
full-time employees with more experience in the workforce 
to ensure the generalizability of our findings. In a related 
vein, while the sample size was large enough to conduct 
our analyses, future studies of these constructs should be 
applied to larger samples to test the reliability of current 
findings. 
Another limitation that must be acknowledged involves 
the employed measures. Specifically, the measures for 
moral imagination were vignette-based type of measure- 
ment which assumes a level of situational fidelity some find 
questionable (Morrison et al. 2004). While we do assume 
that respondents understood the vignettes and responded 
appropriately, one might further argue  that reactions  to 
such scenarios pose an artificial measure of the cognitive 
process being investigated.  Additionally,  in  the  case of 
scenario-based research, ethical situations may be defined 
too briefly for the respondent to evaluate or may fail to 
capture the complexity of issues faced in an actual 
employment setting, in turn potentially limiting participant 
responses (Maclagan 1995; Randall and Gibson 1990). 
Because the limited scope of issues covered in vignettes 
may fail to capture the breadth of the moral experience, 
future research should consider a wider range of situations 
in the workplace. Our vignettes are focused on employee 
behavior and corporate policy. However, it is likely that 
situations pertaining to other issues (e.g., corporate ethics 
on a more strategic scale) would elicit differing participant 
responses. Moreover, other measures such as participant 
observations, in depth interviewing, and longitudinal 
studies may supplement scenario-based research to provide 
an even clearer understanding of the decision-making 
process that individuals use when faced with a potentially 
challenging ethical situation. 
We also wish to emphasize that our hypothesis testing 
was conducted in a cross-sectional manner, which limits 
the extent that causality can be assessed. In particular, 
future research should focus on identifying the antecedents 
that contribute to the formation of moral imagination, 
which have received little research attention to date. 
Determining these antecedents would make it easier for 
researchers to  design  longitudinal  studies  that  focus  on 
the  processes  that  influence  its  expression.  Eventually, 
interventions may be implemented designed to improve 
moral imagination. 
Finally, research within the cognitive neuroscience 
domain has convincingly demonstrated that emotions arise 
when we respond to a wide range of morally significant 
events (Kaplan et al. 2007; Moll et al. 2003; Sanfey et al. 
2003), suggesting that emotions may serve as a catalyst for 
moral motivation. Although some have argued for the 
dominance of intuitive emotion for moral functioning (e.g., 
Haidt 2001), others have criticized the intuitionist 
perspective as limited in its emphasis on naı̈ve intuition 
rather than well-formed deliberation that relies on 
cognitive structures devoted to the interpretation and 
processing of moral issues (Narvaez 2010). While the 
current study took the perspective of cognitive theorists 
who argue that one must first view an issue as falling 
within the moral domain in order to engage moral 
judgment processes (Nucci 2004; Rest 1986), the empirical 
evidence supporting the influence of emotions on moral 
judgment certainly merits future research investigating the 
joint influence of emotions and cognition on moral 
imagination as one considers how one’s actions could 
impact the interests, welfare, and reactions of others. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Scenario #1 
 
Four months ago, a co-worker left and your office has been 
extremely overworked. Furthermore, due to a hiring freeze 
across the company, the vacancy has not been filled. You 
have been working long overtime hours (without overtime 
pay) trying to make up the slack that has occurred due to 
this vacancy. These long hours have begun to take a toll on 
you and your family who feels like your increased time 
away from home is having a negative impact on everyone. 
Good news just came down from your supervisor. The 
hiring freeze has been lifted and you can begin to recruit 
applicants to fill the position. 
After a successful round of interviews with applicants, 
your supervisor has made a selection, but wants your input 
on the final hire. When he tells you who his first choice is, 
you are immediately concerned. The woman he wants to 
hire is pregnant. You discovered this by accident when you 
overheard her talking on her cell phone in the hallway after 
her interview. You are fairly confident your boss does not 
know she is expecting and you know she is not required to 
tell a potential employer that she is pregnant. You cannot 
help but worry that you will spend the next 6 months 
training her and after such time, she will go on maternity 
leave or worse, quit. Then you will be stuck once again 
trying to fill into make up the slack. Your boss asks you for 
your opinion on the candidate. 
 
 
 
Scenario #2 
 
One of your coworkers recently ran into some hard times.  
His wife has lost her job and his family (which includes 
five children) has been having considerable financial 
problems. In order to make some extra money, he has  
recently started painting houses for additional income. In 
order to make people aware of his new business, he has 
been using the company’s e-mail account and telephone to 
schedule jobs and communicate with customers regarding 
job deadlines, payment, and other related details. In addi- 
tion, he has placed the company’s e-mail address and 
telephone number on his personal business cards that he 
has been distributing. 
A few times over the last month, he has called in sick. 
Because he has been calling in frequently, some of his 
work has not been getting done and, as a result, other 
employees (including you) have had to step into fulfill his 
job duties. However, because he never appears to be under 
the weather, you suspect that he has been using sick days to 
get painting work done. 
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